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Abstract
Despite reporting early cases, Japan’s infection rates of Covid-19 have remained low. This commentary considers how a
discourse of cultural exceptionalism dispersed across the networked global public sphere as an explanation for Japan’s low
case count. It also discusses the consequences for wider public understanding of evidence-based public-health interven-
tions to reduce the transmission of the coronavirus.
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While there has been an uptick in Covid-19 cases in Japan
in recent weeks, prompting prime minister Shinzo Abe
to declare a nationwide state of emergency on April 16,
infection rates have remained low. Many acknowledge
that without widespread testing it is difficult to ascer-
tain the extent of Covid-19 in Japan, which at 1.41 tests
performed per 1,000 people is lower than many other
advanced market economies (Japan Ministry of Health,
Labour and Welfare, 2020). Understandably, as the pan-
demic intensified across Europe then the United States
in March, questions were raised about what Japan may
be doing differently that has helped to slow spread of the
virus. Early interventions included the launch of a public
health campaign, in line with recommendations by the
World Health Organisation (WHO), emphasising the im-
portance of basic hygiene and advising people to avoid
the 3Cs of closed spaces, crowded spaces, and close con-
tact, a focus on the identification and containment of in-
fection clusters, and the closure of schools. Some sug-
gested, however, that Japanese culture may in fact ex-
plain its low case count. These include claims that peo-
ple in Japan may be more willing to follow recommen-
dations, the importance of cleanliness and hygiene, the
widespread use and acceptance of facemasks, and greet-
ings that avoid physical contact.
Presently, beyond what is known about the spread
of other respiratory viruses, there is limited scientific
evidence for cultural factors―those that underpin the
adoption of preventative behaviours―in reducing the
spread of Covid-19. Instead, this emphasis on cultural
factors indicates a recycling of a common discourse on
Japan, one that accentuates the homogeneity of cultural
values and practices and its distinctiveness from other
cultures. This discourse has a long history shaping how
the West view Japan but one that is also repurposed by
elites in Japan to underline Japan’s distinction fromother
countries (Iwabuchi, 1994). This commentary considers
why this discourse emerged, both within and outside of
Japan, and how these cultural explanations dispersed
across the networked global public sphere during the
Covid-19 pandemic. It also reflects on the role of critical
voices, in particular those on Twitter, that have warned
that reductionist cultural explanations may detract from
the criticisms of the Japanese government’s response to
the epidemic. The consequences for wider public under-
standing of evidence-based public-health interventions
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to reduce the transmission of the coronavirus will be
also discussed.
Cultural factors are well established as significant
determinants of health, influencing, amongst others,
perceptions of diseases and their management, ap-
proaches to health promotion, and compliance with
recommended treatment options (Pasick, D’onofrio, &
Otero-Sabogal, 1996). Health promotion strategies, con-
sequently, often emphasise cultural sensitivity and the
importance of tailoring messages to recognise these dif-
ferences (Kreuter, Lukwago, Bucholtz, Clark, & Sanders-
Thompson, 2003). It is important to recognise, however,
that there are different conceptions, ideologies, and dis-
courses of a culture, which would suggest caution to-
ward the static, essentialist views of culture that may
support and influence such interventions (Grillo, 2003).
Culture, alternatively, is theorised as dynamic, socially
constructed, and in constant flux. Some argue therefore
that is necessary for health communication to shift from
notions of cultural sensitivity toward a cultural context
approach, where culture-based assumptions are interro-
gated and culture is seen as a “contextually embedded,
complex web of meanings,” which can inform the devel-
opment of effective health communication programmes
(Dutta, 2007).
While it is plausible that culture may intersect with
public health interventions to reduce the spread of the
virus, simply focusing on values or behavioural traits,
at this stage, promotes assertions rather than evidence-
based explanations. Despite that, early in the course of
the pandemic social media were awash with posts claim-
ing that culture may explain Japan’s low infection num-
bers, including tweets that described people’s attention
to hygiene and hand-washing (Rinley, 2020), stressed
the importance of “mask culture,” or championed the
cleanliness of the environment and people’s homes in
Japan (sctm27, 2020; also see Klopp, 2020). Prominent
users also shared data about Japan’s low case numbers
in comparison to its near neighbours in the region or sim-
ply asked what may make Japan an outlier. A YouTube
livestream hosted by popular musician, Yoshiki (2020),
which was widely praised for informing the public about
that virus, explored its impacts and directly addressed
misinformation thatwas circulating about the virus. Such
posts and content online generated substantial debate
about what made Japan different and the part played
by culture and associated behaviours, a discussion that
could be found in comments made in both Japanese and
English. These debates were replicated in mainstream
media, both within Japan (see Klopp, 2020) and inter-
nationally, as a stream of articles and comments across
different media contexts explored Japan’s apparent out-
lier status as the pandemic progressed and other coun-
tries introduced more stringent measures to reduce the
spread of the virus (see Patrick, 2020).
It is not possible to determine the agenda-setting
function of these posts and debates that emerged in
Japan but the timing of and wider dispersal of these
ideas are indicative of the nature of the contemporary
networked media environment and the multidirectional
flows of information thatmay give rise to shared explana-
tions, ideas, and perspectives within different contexts
(Heinrich, 2011).
It is important to note that while social media of-
fered a platform to circulate cultural explanations, it
also provided an important space for debate and crit-
icism of the Japanese government’s strategy and re-
sponse to the epidemic. Most significant were those
that centred on the capacity and strict criteria for test-
ing for Covid-19 (Adelstein, 2020). In recent years, social
media, and specifically Facebook and Twitter, have be-
come more significant in Japan as spaces for critical dis-
course and connective action. Facebook use grew much
slower in Japan than in US and Europe, largely due to
the popularity of the local social media platform Mixi.
Alongside Twitter and other networks, Facebook played
a significant role in movements established to address
ongoing concerns about nuclear power in Japan after
Fukushima, the rise of the Students Emergency Action
for Liberal Democracy against proposed security legisla-
tion that impinged on Japan’s pacifist constitution, and
anti-Olympic activism (Tagsold, 2019). Therefore, at a
time when Japan’s media have been facing greater polit-
ical pressure, as the Abe-led government has attempted
to influence coverage and reduce criticism, social media
served as a valuable space for those that may otherwise
be excluded from debates to be able to offer comment
on the Japanese government’s response to the epidemic.
Platforms such as Twitter also provided a space for
experts to speak directly to the public. In response to
a Twitter thread posted by a journalist writing for the
Japan Times, for example, the infection control expert,
Kentaro Iwata, downplayed assertions that cultural prac-
tices may be contributing to slow the spread of Covid-19,
describing it as “valid but unproven theory” and cau-
tioning against overreliance on these behaviours alone
to reduce transmission (Ripley, 2020). This aligns with
the existing research that shows how social media may
serve as a corrective to false information about health
issues, whether this is through platform-generated algo-
rithms, social comments, or expert correction (Bode &
Vraga, 2018).
Others underline the difficulties that the Japanese
public face in accessing high-quality health information
and its consequences for health literacy. The short-
age of international data and information published in
Japanese, the absence of a central public health agency
to provide “public guidance on how to respond to health
threats,” and the lack of clinicians in leadership roles
that are able to communicate risks effectively to the pub-
lic, as Nakayama (2020) suggests, work together to en-
courage people to seek information from other sources.
Often this will mean turning to misleading or inaccurate
information that may be found online. The absence of
evidence-based information and international compar-
isons in Japanese may have contributed to the prolifer-
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ation online and across social media of speculative infor-
mation that placed undue emphasis on the role of cul-
ture and associated behaviours in minimising the spread
of Covid-19.
The WHO has declared that the pandemic also sees
an accompanying ‘infodemic’ and emphasised the impor-
tance of evidence-based information. While cultural fac-
tors facilitate and might have intersected with the adop-
tion of Covid-19 prevention behaviours recommended
by the WHO, there is currently insufficient evidence to
support the weight afforded to such claims, and the ex-
tent to which they have dispersed across the networked
global public sphere. It is a familiar discourse but one
that contributes to the noise circulating around this pub-
lic health emergency. Later, evidencemay emerge to con-
firm that the progression of the virus in Japanwas slowed
due to the adoption of preventative behaviours. Equally
the opposite may be found, with evidence emerging that
other behaviours attributed to culture may have con-
tributed to its transmission. Nevertheless, we should re-
main cautious about confining such behaviours to partic-
ular national characteristics due to the problematic es-
sentialist notion of culture upon which these assump-
tions are made. For broader public understanding of
Covid-19, asserting the influence of culture may serve to
obfuscate failures in governance and the response to this
global health crisis, especially when barriers to the pub-
lic accessing high-quality health-related information are
at work. It may also contribute to perceptions that some
preventative behaviours and interventions that have con-
firmed positive outcomes are culturally limited and, as a
consequence, impact on people’s willingness to engage
and follow such recommendations.
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